Abstract: This paper studies the income inequality and economic development relationship by using unbalanced panel data on OECD and non-OECD countries for the 
I Introduction
There are different forms of inequality in human history, including aristocratic, racial, sexual, religious, political, social and territorial inequalities. Some inequalities are irrevocable. While the Gini coefficient shows an inter-personal comparison and provides a static snapshot measure of income inequality, improvement in income inequality can often be made intra-personally, as a person's income improves through experience, skill, job diversity and personal endowment (Li, 2002) . Indeed, given that modern societies train and educate people for employment with different rewards, income inequality is inevitable (Letwin, 1983) .
The relationship between income inequality and economic development has been characterized by the Kuznets inverted-U curve (Kuznets, 1955) which argued that income inequality tends to increase at an initial stage of development and then decrease as the economy develops, implying that income inequality will eventually fall as income continues to rise in developing countries. Studies conducted along the line of the inverted-U relationship include Sen (1991 Sen ( , 1992 Sen ( and 1993 who discussed inequality through individual capability and functioning. Some studies concentrate on the causes of income inequality which include human capital, technological advancement, job diversity and political stability, while other studies examine the long run income inequality convergence (Galor and Zeire, 1993; Galor and Moav, 2000; Gould et al. 2001; Acemoglu, 2001; Desai et al. 2005; Bẻnabou, 1996; Ravallion, 2003) .
The Kuznets inverted-U relationship between inequality and economic development has attracted both supporters and critics. In particular, whether the relationship is considered as a law or can be improved through appropriate economic policies (Kanbur, 2000) . Nevertheless, the Kuznets inverted-U relationship has not been fully confirmed and validated in studies with parametric quadratic models (Li et al. 1998 , Barro, 2000 , Bulíř, 2001 , Iradian, 2005 . The importance of the relationship and possible misspecification of parametric quadratic models have led to the use of nonparametric models with cross-section data. For example, by using nonparametric estimation based on a sample of cross-section country data, Mushinski (2001) showed that the quadratic parametric form of the relationship between Gini coefficient and real income per capita is misspecified. Huang (2004) presented a flexible nonlinear framework for a cross-section data of 75 countries and showed evidence of nonlinearity in the inverted-U relation between the Gini and per capita GDP. Lin et al. (2006) confirmed the validity of the inverted-U relationship by presenting a semiparametric partially linear investigation with some control variables using the dataset in Huang (2004) .
In studying the relationship between inequality and development, the choice is whether or not some control variables can be included in the regression model. Some studies have complied with the original work of Kuznets and examined the total effect, instead of the direct effect, of development on inequality by using unconditional models (Mushinski, 2001; Wan, 2002) . In other words, only one regressor of development is used in the regression model. Such a specification considers the inequality-development relationship as a law and minimizes the impact of economic policy. Other studies consider the determinants of inequality and examine the impact of policy in affecting inequality, besides development. That is, the regressors in the regression model include other policy variables and/or economic indicators, besides development (Li et al. 1998; Bulíř, 2001; Wang, 2006; Huang et al. 2009 ). The empirical results from these conditional models do reflect both the direct and indirect (via control variables) effects of development on inequality.
This paper presents a nonparametric (without control variables) and semiparametric (with control variables) investigation on the inequality-development relationship by using unbalanced panel data from the developed OECD (Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development) and the developing non-OECD countries. The unbalanced panel data set provide observations over several periods of time. Such an analysis can incorporate heterogeneity across countries. In the panel data model specification, we allow country-specific effects to be fixed effects that are dependent on the regressors. This can help to obtain consistent estimators in the nonparametric regression function when inequality is regressed on the development variable and/or other control variables. We modify the methodology in Henderson et al. (2008) to cater for the nonparametric and semiparametric estimations with unbalanced panel data, and conduct data-driven specification tests for the selected models.
The empirical results from unconditional and conditional models show that the channel effects of development on inequality via the control variables in both OECD and non-OECD countries are different, and are dependent on the level of development in each country grouping. There is, however, much resemblance in the shapes of the nonparametric functions from both nonparametric and semiparametric estimations in each country group, impling that the control variables as a whole do not change the dynamic mode but the degree of inequality. Development still plays a dominant role in mitigating inequality. For the Kuznets' inverted-U hypothesis, our findings support the cubic and fourth-degree, instead of quadratic polynomials, for OECD and non-OECD countries, respectively, in capturing the nonlinearity suggested by the nonparametric and semiparametric regressions.
Section 2 discusses the data and model specification and presents a parametric study on the inverted-U relationship. Section 3 briefly generalizes the methodology to suit the unbalanced panel data. Section 4 conducts the nonparametric and semiparametric estimations and tests, while Section 5 concludes the paper.
II Data and Model Specification
The Gini coefficient for each country in the sample is used as the inequality proxy, and the dataset is obtained from "All the Ginis Database" under the World Bank project "Inequality around the World". We use real GDP per capita as the proxy for the level of economic development.
Besides studying the total relationship between inequality and development, we also study the direct effect of development on inequality by controlling some other variables.
We consider two kinds of controls. To study the relationship between inequality and economic development, we first specify the following nonparametric (unconditional) panel data model with fixed effects 2 The indirect effects via channels can also be found in growth studies (Barro, 2000; Frankel and Rose, 2002 
Note that in Model (1) there is no control variable in uncovering the relationship between inequality and development. This is consistent with the original idea in Kuznets' inverted-U relationship that provides a general framework to explain inequality unconditional on other variables other than the level of economic development. However, recent studies using econometric models begin to consider determinants of inequality with control variables to study the Kuznets inverted-U relationship, as that can provide ceteris paribus an analysis on the causality from economic development to inequality.
In this study we use both unconditional and conditional models. The semiparametric (conditional) counterpart of Model (1) with control variables can be shown as:
where it x is the vector of the control variables. We adopt the assumptions in Model (1) and that it v is also mean-independent of it x . In our models, the control variable "growth" is used in its lagged form since growth may potentially be endogenous in the inequality model (Huang et al. 2009 ). In Model (2) the indirect effect of development on inequality is controlled by the term ' it x  , hence ( ) g  reflects the inequality from development directly.
The mechanism in Models (1) and (2) and their relationships are intuitively illustrated in Figure 1 . The g(z) in nonparametric Model (1) gives the gross contribution of development to inequality, while the g(z) in semiparametric Model (2) gives the net contribution of development to inequality, given x . The difference between the two g(z)
is the indirect contribution of development to inequality via control variables x . Baltagi, 2008) . However, in order to keep the approach comparable to the nonparametric counterpart, we use the difference of
in removing the fixed effects. Table 3 contains the parametric estimation results for the two samples of OECD and non-OECD countries. The conventional quadratic specification is used to test the Kuznets hypothesis, and the coefficients on the linear and quadratic terms are expected to be positive and negative, respectively. The estimates for the non-OECD countries have the expected signs and are highly significant, while those for the OECD countries do not have the expected signs, regardless whether control variables are added into the model.
We estimated models with higher-degree polynomials of the logarithm of GDP per capita, as shown by the "cubic" and "4-th degree" columns in Table 3 . For OECD, the cubic specification presents significant estimates of the coefficients in both the conditional and unconditional models, while the 4-th degree polynomial specification does not provide significant estimates. For non-OECD, the estimates for the models without controls are all ideal while the estimate in the 4-th degree specifications with controls is perfect, although the quadratic estimate is also ideal as an explanation of the inverted-U relationship. These parametric estimation results show that the quadratic specification does not give a best fit in both samples of OECD and non-OECD countries, thereby casting doubts on the conventional quadratic specification in describing the inequality-development relationship. 0.001* (0.000) Notes: The dependent variable is Gini. The numbers in the parentheses are standard errors of the coefficient estimates. Estimates of the intercepts in parametric models are not reported. * = 5% significance and ** = 10% significance.
III Nonparametric Estimation and Testing Method with Unbalanced Panel Data
We use the same notation as those in Henderson et al. (2008) to illustrate our model estimation in the unbalanced panel data case. For simplicity, we denote y gini  and z lgdp  . Models (1) and (2) can be estimated by the iterative procedures modified slightly from Henderson et al. (2008) to cater for the unbalanced panel data.
To remove the fixed effects in Model (1), we write
, and
The variance-covariance matrix of i v  and its inverse are calculated, respectively, as 
Denote the first derivatives of 1 ( , )
. It can be estimated by solving the first order conditions of the above criterion function through iteration: 
, where
The series method is used to obtain the initial estimator for ( ) g  . The convergence criterion for the iteration is set to be 
We use the series method to obtain an initial estimator for ( )   and then conduct the iteration process. The convergence criterion for the iteration is set to be 
For the estimation of semiparametric Model (2), we denote the nonparametric estimator of the regression functions of the dependent variable y and the control variables x , respectively, as ˆ( ) matrices with the t -th row element being
The nonparametric function ( ) g  is estimated by the same method shown above, except that it y  is replaced by
For the selected model to incorporate a data-driven procedure, we further modify the specification tests to an unbalanced panel data case. Regardless whether the models have control variables as regressors, we perform the following two specification tests.
The first specification test is to choose in Model (1) The test statistic for testing this null is In the following empirical study, we apply bootstrap procedures in Henderson et al. (2008) to approximate the finite sample null distribution of test statistics and obtain the bootstrap probability values for the test statistics.
IV Empirical Results
The kernel in both the estimation and the testing is the Gaussian function and the bandwidth is chosen according to the rule of thumb Table 3 reports the coefficient estimation for the control variables in the parametric part of semiparametric Model (2). For the OECD countries, with the exception of "openk" and "urbanize", the coefficient estimates of all other control variables have the same signs and similar values in both parametric and semiparametric models. For countries in the non-OECD sample, with the exception of the "urbanize" variable, the coefficient estimates of all other control variables are highly similar in both parametric and semiparametric models.
The inconsistency in the coefficient estimates of such variables as "urbanize" and "openk" casts doubts on model specification once again, but this will be tested in the final stage of our analysis. An interesting finding is the different signs in the coefficients of investment and inflation between the two samples. Investment share has a positive effect on inequality in OECD, but a negative effect in non-OECD, implying that investment aggravates inequality in OECD countries, while it alleviates inequality in non-OECD countries. The effect of inflation is exactly the opposite to that of investment between the OECD and non-OECD countries.
In Table 4 , the nonparametric function ( ) g  is estimated at some quantile points of the logarithm of GDP per capita by using nonparametric Model (1) and semiparametric Model (2). For the OECD countries, when their development level is at the 2.5 percent quantile from the bottom, the estimate of ( ) g  from semiparametric Model (2) is larger than that from nonparametric Model (1). The difference is the total contribution by control variables to inequality. But when the development level is one of the other quantiles, the estimate of ( ) g  from nonparametric Model (1) becomes larger, which implies that the integrated contribution by control variables to inequality becomes positive. In short, policy variables and economic characteristics can indeed play a role in affecting inequality in the higher stage of development. However, the estimation results in OECD countries are opposite to those in non-OECD countries. Table 4 shows that for the non-OECD countries all the estimates of ( ) g  at each quantile from semiparametric Model (2) are larger than that at the same quantile from nonparametric Model (1). The integrated contribution of control variables to inequality is therefore negative, namely, they totally decrease inequality. We next discuss and compare the results from the OECD and non-OECD countries.
OECD Countries
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the nonparametric and semiparametric estimations of ( ) g  in Models (1) and (2) (2001) reflected the predominance of middle-income countries in his dataset, the result from our dataset using nonparametric estimation for the OECD countries (representing mainly high-income or upper-middle-income countries) reflect the predominance of the high-income and upper-middle-income group. Also, the curves hint an upturn at a higher income level (around 10.8, about $49,020), which accords with the high-level upturn point from a highly developed economy (Ram, 1991) .
The contribution of development to the reduction of inequality via control variables can be seen from the vertical difference between the two "nonparametric" and "semiparametic" curves in Figure 4 . The integrated effect of development on inequality via the control variables is negative at lower income levels (lower than 9.2, about $9,900) since the curve from nonparametric estimation is below that from semiparametric The analysis so far shows that nonparametric and semiparametric estimations can provide additional information on the mechanism of economic development on inequality.
However, which specification is most suited to the sample requires further hypothesis tests. Table 5 presents various test results. In the case without control variables, the p-values for the quadratic and cubic parametric specifications against nonparametric specification are, respectively, 0.07 and 0.06. At the 10 percent significant level, the nulls of quadratic and cubic parametric specifications are rejected and the alternative, nonparametric specification is accepted. However, at the 5 percent level, the nulls are accepted. In the case with control variables, the p-values are less than 5 percent. So we reject the nulls of parametric specification at the 5 percent level and accept the semiparametric specification. The test results shown in Table 5 provide further support to our analysis. Since the cubic parametric model without control variables is accepted at the conventional 5 percent significant level (note that the quadratic curve is not considered here because its estimate is not significant, see Table 3 : OECD), we include the curve of the estimated cubic function in Figure 4 . This cubic function implies a turning point which is almost the same as those in the curves from the nonparametric and semiparametric estimations, and hence can capture some of the non-concavities suggested by the nonparametric and semiparametric regressions. The F test for the parametric specifications in Table 6 shows that the cubic function of the logarithm of GDP per capita provides a fit better than the quadratic function and cannot be rejected against the alternative fourth-degree specification. Table 3 (OECD) also shows that all terms in the cubic polynomial are significant, and they are better than the estimates in quadratic and fourth-degree polynomials. Hence the tests support the estimation of a cubic function of development for the OECD sample rather than a quadratic or fourth-degree function in the case of no control variables. Note: * = 5% significance.
In the case with control variables, the tests in Table 6 present no obvious evidences to show which parametric specification is best. One can conclude from Table 3 (OECD) that the cubic form is preferred since all the estimated coefficients of the cubic polynomial statistically prevail over those of the quadratic and fourth-degree counterparts.
However, as the test with control variables in Table 5 shows, parametric cubic specification is rejected and semiparametric model is accepted at the 5 percent significant level. Hence, the insignificance of the F tests in the case of control variables for OECD countries is expected since the F tests based on the estimation of parametric model may not be valid for semiparametric models.
Non-OECD Countries
Figures 5 and 6 respectively present the nonparametric estimation of ( ) g  in Models (1) and (2) for the non-OECD sample countries. The estimates provide a result stronger than those in Figures 1 and 2 since the boundary effect for nonparametric estimation is less significant. There is much resemblance between the shapes of nonlinearity of ( ) g  in Figures 5 and 6 . The results reflect a rapid increasing, albeit short, portion at lower levels of development and a first turning point at 7 (about $1,100), then another increasing, albeit long and flat, portion at the middle income level of development, then followed by a slowly decreasing portion of the curve with the second turning point at 8.7 (about $6,000). Finally, the curves also hint at an upturn at a higher income level (around 10, about $22,026), similar to the processes shown in OECD countries and the findings in Ram (1991) and Mushinski (2001) . The second turning point is higher than the first one and the final upturn occurs at even higher inequality level. This process presents a "roller coaster" mode, albeit flat and long in the middle of the process.
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In the non-OECD countries, if the final upturn is not accounted for, the process approximately accords with the inverted-U hypothesis. Table 6 show, when compared to the third-and fifth-degree polynomial specifications, that the fourth-degree polynomial of the logarithm of GDP per capita gives a sufficiently accurate description of the non-OECD countries, whether or not the control variables are added into the models. Recall in Table   3 (non-OECD) that all coefficient estimates in the fourth-degree polynomials are significant at the 5 percent level. Hence the fourth-degree function specification gives a better description of the data than the quadratic and cubic polynomials. The tests for the non-OECD countries support the estimation of a fourth-degree function of development rather than a quadratic or cubic form.
6 Figure 7 contains also the curve of the estimated fourth-degree polynomial. It shows that the fourth-degree function can capture some of the non-concavities suggested by nonparametric and semiparametric regressions. Although the shape resembles the inverted-U relastionship, with the exception when the development reaches a very high level, the conventional quadratic form used to estimate the inequality-development relationship might be misspecified for the non-OECD dataset.
6 Such a support on the use of a fourth-degree polynomial rather than a quadratic form can also be seen in Mushinski (2001) . and the other being at a middle income level (about $6,000) (see Figure 7 ). Generally, when the level of economic development is not very high, inequality in OECD/non-OCED countries will decrease/increase with development. However, both curves make an upturn at an advanced level of development, though they act with a different manner: inequality in OECD countries shows an upturn at a lower inequality level than non-OECD countries. If this upturn were not accounted for, the evidence from OECD countries would roughly suggest that the inverted-U relationship between inequality and development is located beyond the turning point and on the backside of the inverted-U, while the non-OECD evidence shows that the relationship roughly accords with a full inverted-U relationship. show that the data-driven model selection for OECD countries requires a semiparametric specification while the non-OECD countries require a fourth-degree polynomial parametric specification. Given the integrated contribution by control variables to inequality shown above, we next study the effects of the control variables on inequality by comparing the estimates in the parametric part of the semiparametrc model for the OECD countries (shown in the last column in Table 3 ) and the 4-th degree parametric model for the non-OECD countries (shown in the "4-th degree" column in Table 3 ). The implications of the effects of the control variables are different in the two sample country groups, except the variable "growth (-1)" which has a positive effect on inequality.
Specifically, the effect of openness on inequality in OECD countries is negative, albeit insignificant both economically and statistically, while openness has a positive and significant effect on inequality in non-OECD countries. Openness generally will aggravate income inequality in non-OECD countries, but has an emollient effect on inequality in OECD countries. Although integration to the world market is expected to help non-OECD countries to promote prosperity, increasing opportunities to trade are also likely to affect income distribution. Whether or not increasing openness to trade is accompanied by a reduction or an increase inequality has strongly been debated (Julien, 2007; Wood, 1997) .
The effect of urbanization on inequality is negative (-0.171) and significant for OECD countries, but positive (0.007) and insignificant for non-OECD countries.
Urbanization helps to mitigate inequality in OECD countries, but increases inequality in non-OECD countries, albeit insignificantly. According to Anand (1993) , the urban-rural difference generally results in larger inequality in total income distribution due to urbanization. Hence, in the process of urbanization, income inequality will first increase and then decrease with urbanization or the migration of rural population to cities. In our case, OECD countries have much higher urbanization than non-OECD countries. Hence the negative effect of urbanization on inequality in OECD and the positive effect in non-OECD accord with this general urbanization-inequality relationship.
The finding that investment share aggravates inequality in OECD countries but reduces inequality in non-OECD countries contrasts with the result in Barro (1999) that showed little overall relationship between income inequality and investment. One explanation is that investment may have potential endogeneity in inequality models.
Inflation has a negative albeit insignificant effect on inequality in OECD countries but has a positive and significant effect on inequality in non-OECD countries. Generally, cross-country evidence on inflation and income inequality suggests that they are positively related. For example, Albanesi (2007) argued that the correlation between inflation and income inequality is the outcome of a distributional conflict underlying the determination of government policies, and inflation is positively related to the degree of inequality as low income households are more vulnerable to inflation. Since non-OECD countries have a high average inflation, their monetary authorities should reduce inflation to alleviate income inequality. However, the impact of inflation on income distribution may be nonlinear (Bulíř, 2001) , and the positive and significant effect of inflation on inequality would need to be explained with caution.
V Conclusion
This paper provides evidences on the relationship between inequality and development from estimations and tests of nonparametric and semiparametric panel data models with fixed effects. Based on an unbalanced panel dataset, this study contributes to the literature by presenting new evidences about the inequality-development relationship in OECD and non-OECD countries and provides additional information on the mechanics of the effect of development on inequality.
For the OECD countries, inequality generally decreases with development, with the exception of an upturn at a higher income level. The control variables will help reduce income inequality at lower income levels (below about $9,900), but they tend to increase inequality when development exceeds that level. For the non-OECD countries, the inequality-development relationship appears in a "roller coaster" mode with two turning points, and one upturn appears at a very high income level. When compared to the performance in OECD countries, the effect of development on inequality via the control variables is always negative in non-OECD countries, except after an upturn at a high income level. Non-OECD countries seem to face serious inequality at the middle or high income level.
Nonparametric estimations without control variables suggest that a polynomial of higher-degree might give a sufficiently accurate description of both OECD and non-OECD countries. Our tests support estimating a cubic function of development for the OECD sample and a fourth-degree function of development for the non-OECD sample. Both the parametric estimates capture some of the non-concavities suggested by nonparametric and semiparametric regressions.
Semiparametric estimations and tests with control variables present some implications on policy. In OECD countries, growth and investment share in GDP aggravate inequality, but openness, urbanization and inflation would reduce inequality. In non-OECD countries, growth, openness, urbanization, and inflation generally increase inequality, but investment share helps mitigate inequality. It would be appropriate to argue that investment in non-OECD countries should be geared more to improve the conditions of the low income groups, as that shall reduce inequality overtime.
